



Concerning the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments
Introduction
The laws of the various jurisdictions in the United States are far from
uniform concerning the effect to be given foreign-country judgments and
the elements that must be proved to support or defeat their recognition.
This article will survey the common law of this country and compare it to
both the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act' and the
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. It will also suggest a method for
allocating the burden of proof between the parties advocating the recogni-
tion or nonrecognition of a judgment from a foreign nation.
1. Distinction Between Full Faith and
Credit and Comity
The U.S. Constitution requires each state to give full faith and credit to
the public acts, records and judicial proceedings (including judgments) 2 of
every other state, 3 but this provision does not give any right, privilege, or
immunity to the judgments of courts of foreign countries.4 While not
directly applicable to the judgments of other nations, the full faith and
*The authors practice law in Texas.
-13 U.L.A. 417 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition
Act].
2U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1966); Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939).
4Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912). See also Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 (1972); Schoenbrod v. Siegler, 20 N.Y.2d 403, 230 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1967); Christopher v.
Christopher, 31 S.E.2d 818, 827 (Ga. 1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 98, comment b (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
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credit clause has certainly influenced the development of American recog-
nition practice.5 Some U.S. courts have even talked loosely of giving full
faith and credit to foreign-country judgments,6 and one court even awarded
a Costa Rican judgment full faith and credit and comity.7
The overwhelming majority of courts in the country hold that the recog-
nition of foreign judicial acts is governed by the doctrine of comity. 8 The
Supreme Court defined comity in 1895:
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judi-
cial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and con-
venience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.9
ne New York Court of Appeals modified this definition thirty-one years
later when it defined comity in the following terms:
Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of practice, convenience and expedi-
ency. It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to
the opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of
decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question. 10
This definition was explained and elaborated upon most recently by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals:
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of
practice, convenience, and expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and
accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation.
Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due
regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons
protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance
would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it
effect. I I
5Compagnie du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163, 166 (D.
Me. 1927) (the full faith and credit clause establishes comity between states); Neporany v. Kir,
5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149 (Ist Dep't 1958), appeal dismissed, 7 App. Div. 2d
836, 184 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1st Dep't 1959); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estop-
pelin the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44, 45-46 (1962).
6E.g., Scott v. Scott, 331 P.2d 641, 643 (Cal. 1958); Willson v. Willson, 55 So.2d 905, 906
(Fla. 1951); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121,
124 (1926).
7Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aqfdper
curiam, 553 F.2d 1009 (1977).
'See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 228 (1895); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972);
Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 1969); Yoder v. Yoder, 24 Ohio App. 2d 71, 263
N.E.2d 913, 914-15 (1970).
'Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
'"Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926)
[citation omitted].
"Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
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The U.S. Supreme Court based its view of comity upon the concept that
international law -is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity,'12 but this
basis has found scant support with later authorities. Modern cases have
said that comity rests rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judg-
ment and the policy of discouraging repeated litigation of the same
matters. 13
Recently, the United States has attempted to provide a firmer basis for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments by negotiat-
ing its first treaty covering this subject. The Convention Between the
United Kingdom and the United States for the Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters 14 was initialed by the parties in
October 1976.15 The primary impetus for this Convention resulted from
the discrimination against American judgments mandated by the European
Economic Community's Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.1 6 It was hoped that the
U.S.-U.K. treaty would eliminate such discrimination on a bilateral basis
and would become the model for bilateral treaties with other nations.17
Because of adverse comments received in each country, the treaty has been
renegotiated and has not yet come into force. Moreover, the prospects for
early ratification of the Convention have been dimmed by the passage in
Great Britain of the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980.18
2. Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement
Traditionally, litigants have not been able to enforce foreign-nation judg-
ments directly in this country; they have first been required to persuade a
U.S. court to recognize the judgment. ' 9 Recognition occurs when one court
concludes that a certain matter has already been decided by another court's
"Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
"Eg., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926);
RESTATEMENT § 98, comment b (1972), Smit, supra note 4, at 56; Peterson, Foreign Country
Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 200, 239-248
(1972).
4 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 71 (1977).
"Smit, The Proposed United States- United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments: A Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977); Hay & Walker,
The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between the United States and the United
Kingdom, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 421, 422-23 (1976).
"6See Hay & Walker, The Proposed US.-UK Recognition-of-Judgments Convention.
Another Perspective, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 753, 757-58 (1978); Smith, supra note 15, at 445, 468.
See also Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments An Interim Update, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 441-42 (1977).
"See Hay & Walker, supra note 16, at 767-68; Smit, supra note 15, at 445, 468; Hay &
Walker, supra note 15, at 423, 450-451.
"
8See generally Rosen, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 INT'L LAW. 213 (1981);
Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line,
14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980).
'
9 Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill. App. 3d 849, 360 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1977); von Mehren,
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 402, 404 (1977).
428 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
judgment and will not be'litigated further.20 The court then enters its own
judgment based on the foreign decree. A judgment is enforced when a
party is accorded the relief that he seeks. 2'
Recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement of a foreign judgment, but it
does not necessarily mean that the judgment is entitled to enforcement. For
example, in 164 East Seventy-Second Street Corporation v. Ismay,22 a Cali-
fornia court distinguished between the right to procure and the right to
enforce a judgment and stated that whether or not one is entitled to enforce
an existing judgment does not affect the right to maintain an action to pro-
cure a new one.
23
The drafters of the Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act and the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 24 intended them to alter
the traditional rule. One of the comments to the Uniform Foreign Judg-
ments Recognition Act states that it is intended to be enforced by the meth-
ods provided in the Uniform Enforcement Act, 25 the latter providing for
registration of foreign judgments without the necessity for filing a new suit
to obtain recognition.26 This view is confirmed by a close reading of the
two acts. The Uniform Enforcement Act states that a "foreign judgment"
means one "that is entitled to full faith and credit," 27 and the Uniform
Foreign Judgments Recognition Act provides that a foreign-country judg-
ment is to be enforced in the same way as a sister state judgment that is
entitled to full faith and credit. 28
Despite these indications of intent, some courts have refused to permit
the registration of foreign-nation judgments by the methods set out in the
Uniform Enforcement Act. 29 Although these rulings provide no rationale
for the failure to give effect to the drafters' intent, they can be justified on
practical grounds. Foreign-country judgments cannot be enforced in an
American jurisdiction without first being translated from the foreign cur-
rency into U.S. dollars. Neither the Uniform Foreign Judgments Recogni-
tion Act nor the Uniform Enforcement Act address this problem, and
without some guidance as to the date for determining the exchange rate, the
clerk cannot register the judgment and translate it into domestic currency.
20
von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the
United States, 6 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 37, 38 (1974).
2
"Id. Recognition is only the first step in the process of enforcement. Biel v. Boehm, 94
Misc. 2d 946, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (1978); Zaphiriou, TransnationalRecognition and Enforce-
ment of Civil Judgments, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 734 (1978).
22151 P.2d 29 (Cal. App. 1944).
"Id. at 30.
13 U.L.A. 173 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Uniform Enforcement Act].
2513 U.L.A. 420 (1980).
26Uniform Enforcement Act § 2.
"Id. at § 1.
"Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 3.
"Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc. 2d 946, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (1978); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45
111. App. 3d 849, 360 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 111. App. 3d 1047, 274 N.E.2d
157, 160 (1971).
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Therefore, recognition still remains a prerequisite to enforcement even in
states that have adopted the Uniform Acts.
3. Choice of Law.- Federal or State
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether federal or state law gov-
erns the recognition of foreign-nation judgments. At present, no treaty or
federal statute preempts state authority in this area. Despite the decision of
the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot,30 most state3 l and federal 32 courts
that have faced the question have held that state, rather than federal, law
applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments.
Should it be faced with the issue, the Supreme Court may decide that
enforcement of judgments is a matter within state control.33 On the other
hand, it may decide that state courts are intruding into the field of foreign
affairs when they decide whether the judgments of other countries should
be enforced, as Oregon's courts did in interpreting state inheritance reci-
procity requirements. 34 The federal government is preeminent in the field
of foreign affairs; and "in respect of our foreign relations generally, state
lines disappear." 35 A different route by which the court could decide that
federal law should control the question is suggested by the court's federali-




The basic requirements to be met before an American court wil recog-
nize and enforce a judgment rendered in a foreign country were laid down
87 years ago in Hilton v. Guyot:
30159 U.S. 113 (1895).
3 Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tenn. 1978); Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796,
800-801 (Minn. 1976); Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818, 827 (1944); 164
East Seventy-Second Street Corp. v. Ismay, 151 P.2d 29, 30 (Cal. 1944); Smith v. Smith, 72
Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889, 893 (1943); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926); RESTATEMENT § 98, comment e (1971).
"Her Majesty, Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1979); Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d 611, 614
(1st Cir. 1977); British Midland Airways Ltd. v. International Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871
(9th Cir. 1974); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp.
1009, 1011-12 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.
Mass. 1966).
33Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). On the question of whether there
should be a federal common law governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign-coun-
try judgments, see generally von Mehren, supra note 19, at 406-8.
'Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 20, at
40.
"United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (states may not refuse to honor federal
international compacts and agreements).
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
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When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a
court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign
judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court havng jurisdiction
of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs and opportu-
nity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a
civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment
is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should
be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless some special
ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was affected
by fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of international law and by the
comity of our own country it should not be given full credit and effect.
37
These requirements have been adopted almost verbatim by many American
courts,3 8 and the Hilton language still remains the predominant statement
of the elements which must exist before a foreign-country judgment will be
recognized in the United States. Most of these same elements have been
encompassed in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.39
But putting all the factors relevant to recognition of foreign judgments in
one general statement has led some courts to confuse defenses with the ele-
ments of a prima facie case. For example, the absence of fraud has been
listed by a few courts as part of the plaintifi's case. 40 This, of course, is
unfortunate, because fraud is generally regarded as an affirmative defense.
In addition, violation of the public policy of the forum and lack of reciproc-
ity should also be considered as affirmative defenses; otherwise, the plaintiff
would be required to prove a negative. Furthermore, such an ordering of
the case is consistent With the language in Hilton that a foreign judgment
satisfying the first stated requirements would be held conclusive "unless
some special ground is shown for impeaching" it.4 '
In addition to Hilton's requirements, a judgment must generally be final
"7159 U.s. 113, 205-6 (1895).38See, e.g. Her Majesty, Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161,
1163 n.4, (9th Cir. 1979); John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty. Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co., Ltd., 569
F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1978); Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion C. por A.,
556 F.2d 611, 615 (lst Cir. 1977); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453
F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Toronto-Dominion Bank v.
Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232
F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1964); In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. 964, 969
(S.D.N.Y. 1937), aft'd, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938); Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 147 A. 714
(Md. 1929); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (1915).
39A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the underlying
cause of action are concerned. RESTATEMENT § 98 (1971).
A judgment is valid if: (a) the state in which it is rendered has jurisdiction to act judicially
in the case; and (b) a reasonable method of modification is employed and a reasonable
opportunity to be heard is afforded to persons affected; and (c) the judgment is rendered by
a competent court; and (d) there is compliance with such requirements of the state of rendi-
tion as are necessary for the valid exercise of power by the court.
Id. § 92.
'See, e.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 894 (N.D. Tex. 1980);
Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 406 (S.D. Tex. 1980).41Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-6 (1895).
U.S. Practice.- Recognition of Foreign Judgments 431
before it will be enforced in the United States.4 2 Judgments subject to mod-
ification in the country where rendered do not lack finality when the subse-
quent suit is brought to enforce only amounts that have already accrued
under the judgment.4 3 In child custody cases a material change of circum-
stances will always allow for modification of a court order, and U.S. courts
have felt free to consider the change of circumstances in a suit brought to
enforce a foreign custody decree.44
A California statute allows recognition of a foreign-country judgment if
it is final, if it has been rendered by a tribunal of a foreign country, and if
the tribunal had jurisdiction according to the laws of its own country. 45
The Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act, which has been adopted
in twelve states, 46 provides recognition to a foreign-country judgment
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money4 7 if the judgment is final,
conclusive and enforceable where rendered. 48 In addition, the Uniform Act
lists three mandatory grounds for nonrecognition-lack of personal juris-
diction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the rendering of the judg-
ment under a legal system which does not provide impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with due process. 49 Although this is an awkward
way of saying it, the intention is to establish these things as elements of the
plaintiffs case. But the other seven grounds for nonrecognition found in a
separate subdivision of the Act (such as fraud, conflict with the forum's
public policy, and lack of reciprocity, among others) are permissive or dis-
cretionary only.50 Thus, they should be regarded as affirmative defenses.
At common law under the holding of Hilton, the elements of the plain-
tiffs case are:
1. a final judgment;
2. subject matter jurisdiction;
3. jurisdiction over the parties or the res;
4. timely and proper notice of the proceedings;
5. an opportunity to present a defense to an unbiased tribunal; and
41Coulborn v. Joseph, 25 S.E.2d 576, 581 (Ga. 1943); Kordoski v. Belanger, 160 A. 205 (R.I.
1932); Growe v. Growe, 2 Mich. App. 25, 138 N.W.2d 537, 540-541 (1965); Uniform Foreign
Judgments Recognition Act § 2. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of For-
eign Adudications." A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1601, 1656-60
(1968).43Coulborn v. Joseph, 25 S.E.2d 576, 581 (Ga. 1943); Growe v. Growe, 2 Mich. App. 25, 138
N.W.2d 537, 540-541 (1965). But see Kordoski v. Belanger, 160 A. 205 (R.I. 1932).
"Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195 A.2d 418, 421 (Conn. 1963); Willson v. Willson, 55 So.2d 905,
906 (Fla. 1951); Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431, 439 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972). See
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Md. 1961).
"SCAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1915 (West Supp. 1972).
'Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.4
'Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 1(2). The Act excludes judgments for





6. regular proceedings conducted according to a system of civilized
jurisprudence.
The plaintiffs burden under the Uniform Act is to establish:
1. a final judgment, conclusive and enforceable where rendered;
2. subject matter jurisdiction;
3. jurisdiction over the parties or the res; and
4. regular proceedings conducted under a system that provides impartial
tribunals and procedures compatible with due process.
Jurisdiction
U.S. courts generally will not recognize or enforce foreign-nation judg-
ments from courts that did not have jurisdiction of the parties5 ' or the sub-
ject matter. 52 Hilton required an "opportunity for a. . . trial abroad before
a Court of competent jurisdiction, . . . after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant,"'53 and the Court further stated that "[e]very
foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled to any effect,
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and
upon regular proceedings and due notice."' 54 A foreign judgment is not
conclusive under the Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act if the
court rendering it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant or
jurisdiction over the subject matter.5 5 The courts of this country apply U.S.
standards of due process when determining whether the foreign court had
jurisdiction to render the judgment. 56
A general appearance in a foreign court gives the court in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant.57 In accordance with International Shoe5 8
and its progeny, personal jurisdiction can also be obtained by consent 59 or
by proper service on a party that has minimum contacts with the jurisdic-
tion rendering judgment.60 For example, an American resident entering
into a contract in Canada has been held subject to the jurisdiction of the
"RESTATEMENT § 104 (1971).
lId. § 105.
:'Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
4 Id. at 166-67.
"Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 4(a)(2)-(3).
6 Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Royal
Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 406 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Cherun v. Frish-
man, 236 F. Supp. 292, 296 (D.D.C. 1964); Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio
1951); Compagnie du Port de Rio de Janiero v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163, 166-67
(D. Me. 1927); Davidson & Co. v. Allen, 508 P.2d 6, 7-8 (Nev. 1973); Rzeszotarski v. Rzes-
zotarski, 296 A.2d 431, 437 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
'
7 Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524, 530 (1889); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W.
711 (1915); Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 5(a)(2); RESTATEMENT § 33 (1971).
" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); Uniform For-
eign Judgments Recognition Act § 5(a)(3); RESTATEMENT § 32 (1971).
'See Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 5(a)(1); RESTATEMENT § 28 (1971).
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Canadian courts even though he was never in Canada and was personally
served in California. 6 1
The Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act provides that a foreign
court can obtain personal jurisdiction if the defendant was personally
served in the foreign country; the defendant voluntarily appeared in the
proceedings; the defendant consented to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court; the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state; the defendant cor-
poration had its principal place of business, was incorporated, or had
acquired corporate status, in the foreign country; the defendant had a busi-
ness office in the foreign country and the proceedings involved business
conducted through that office; or the defendant operated a motor vehicle or
airplane in the foreign country and the proceedings involved the vehicle or
airplane. 62 The Act permits state courts to recognize other bases of jurisdic-
tion.63 The Restatement of Conflicts also reflects the expanding scope of
personal jurisdiction.64
An appearance by a defendant merely to contest the jurisdiction of the
court over him will not give the foreign court personal jurisdiction under
the Uniform Act.65 If the defendant did not appear in the foreign action,
then he will be allowed to contest the issue of jurisdiction when the judg-
ment is presented for recognition by an American court.6 6 Recent cases
have suggested that if the defendant contested the jurisdiction of the foreign
court abroad, he will not again be allowed to do so in a U.S. court where
the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced.67 While this is in line with
the Supreme Court's holding in domestic cases,68 it may mean that a for-
eign-nation judgment will not be measured by our due process standards.
One court has recently held that raising the jurisdictional question abroad
followed by participation in a trial on the merits will not be considered a
waiver of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights or a consent to the
foreign court's jurisdiction.69
The Uniform Act does not address the question of in rem jurisdiction. In
rem jurisdiction can be defined as the power to adjudicate all rights with
respect to a thing.70 Hilton v. Guyot noted in dicta that in rem judgments
'Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 1977). But cf. Boivin v.
Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (notice by publication); Compagnie du Port
de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D. Me. 1927) (company
not doing business).
"
2Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 5(a).
W31d. § 5(b).
'RESTATEMENT §§ 24-52 (1971).
"'Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 5(a)(2).
'Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 406 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
"Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp. v. Instituto Mexicano del Cafe, 566 F.2d 861, 863
(2d Cir. 1977); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd.,
470 F. Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
"'Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
'Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
7°von Mehren, supra note 19, at 409.
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were considered conclusive everywhere with respect to the rights in the
thing.71 The property must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
and must be actually attached, however, before the court acquires in rem
jurisdiction to enter a judgment with respect to the property. 72 Further-
more, an in rem judgment is conclusive only as to the property actually
involved in the foreign suit 73 and the property must have minimum con-
tacts with the action in order to support in rem jurisdiction. 74 Monetary
judgments are generally considered in personam rather than in rem.75
Accordingly, a court cannot, incidentally to an in rem decree, grant an




American courts generally hold fraud to be a defense to the recognition
of a foreign-nation judgment.77 Not every species of fraud, however, is a
defense. Intrinsic fraud, such as fraud in the underlying transaction or in
the trial itself (i.e., perjury or false documents), is no defense. 78 The fraud
must be extrinsic, that is, fraud that deprives a party of an opportunity to
present adequately his claim or defense. 79 The distinction is based on the
assumption that the foreign court had an opportunity to pass on the probity
and veracity of the evidence before it and has already determined the mat-
ters raised by a plea of intrinsic fraud. 80 Extrinsic fraud must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, 81 and the claim of extrinsic fraud must not
have been presented to the court at the original trial. 82 One court has held
71 159 U.S. 113, 167 (1895).
"Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711, 713 (1915).
7"Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 218 F.
Supp. 938, 943 (D. Md. 1963), a#-d, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964).
"Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-9, 212 (1977).
"Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.D.C. 1964).
"China Mut. Ins. Co. v. Force, 36 N.E. 874, 876 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1894).
"'See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895) (dicta); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 442 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Uniform
Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b)(2); RESTATEMENT § 98, comment g, § 115, com-
ments a, d (1971).
"MacKay v. Alexander, 268 F.2d 35, 39 (9th Cir. 1959) (fraud in obtaining a Canadian
naturalization decree by false statements rejected); Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp.
1243, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (fraud in the underlying transaction rejected); RESTATEMENT § 98,
comment g, § 115, comments a, d (1971). See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 206-10
(1895). The Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act allows for impeachment of a for-
eign judgment if it "was obtained by fraud." Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act
§ 4(b)(2). While the Act does not specifically distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud,
the reference to "obtained by" might be interpreted as requiring a showing of extrinsic fraud.
"Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d 667, 671 (Ist Cir. 1929).
"Id. at 671-72.
"'Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1976).
"
2Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d 667, 671 (lst Cir. 1929).
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that a stranger to a foreign judgment can impeach it for fraud, even extrin-
sic, only by showing that if it is enforced, his rights will be prejudiced. 8 3
2. Reciprocity
The U.S. Supreme Court first adopted reciprocity as a requirement for
recognizing and enforcing foreign-country judgments in Hilton v. Guyot. 84
The Court held that a judgment of France (a country that allows a full
review of American judgments) would be considered only prima facie evi-
dence of the justice of a plaintiff's claim and would not be given conclusive
effect.85 The Court limited its holding to in personam judgments in favor
of a foreign national rendered by the courts of his country against a for-
eigner.86 The Court's opinion indicates that lack of reciprocity will not pre-
vent American courts from giving conclusive effect to a foreign-country
judgment when the judgment is based upon in rem or quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion, when the judgment affects the status of persons, when the judgment is
between citizens of foreign countries, or when the judgment is in favor of a
U.S. citizen. 8 7 Indeed, one court has held that the reciprocity rule was
based upon a desire to protect American nationals and was limited to cases
in which it was invoked by an American citizen.
88
Commentators have overwhelmingly criticized the reciprocity require-
ment for several reasons. First, the judgment creditor has no control over
the acts of the foreign country rendering the judgment. 89 Second, it is
doubtful that it achieves either of its two goals of protecting Americans
abroad or encouraging foreign countries to give conclusive effect to Ameri-
can judgments.90 Third, the reciprocity rule ignores the basic policy under-
lying the recognition and enforcement of foreign-nation judgments, namely
that of putting an end to litigation.9'
Only a few American jurisdictions have actually rejected the reciprocity
doctrine, 92 but others have found ways to distinguish it 93 or to apply law
which does not include it. 94 The trend away from a reciprocity requirement
can even be seen in recent Supreme Court opinions in which the Court
declined to require that a foreign nation extend to the United States stand-
83The W. Talbot Dodge, 15 F.2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
8159 U.S. 113, 210, 227-28 (1895).
151d. at 227.
161d. at 170-171.
87von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 20, at 48; Reese, The Status in This Country of Judg-
ments RenderedAbroad, 50 COLuM. L. REV. 791-92 (1950).
"'Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 505 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
SReese, supra note 87, at 793.
9°ld.
9 1d. at 785.
92Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1976); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926). Contra Hager v. Hager, 1 111. App.
3d 1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971) (requires reciprocity).913Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 505 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961) (reciprocity
could not be invoked by foreign plaintiffs).
"Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (predicts
Arkansas law would not require reciprocity).
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ing to sue in its courts before it could sue in U.S. courts95 and struck down
an Oregon statute limiting the right of foreigners to inherit U.S. property to
those who are nationals of countries which allow Americans to inherit.
96
The latter holding may even imply that the states are not free to adopt a
reciprocity requirement with respect to foreign-country judgments. 97
The Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act does not make reci-
procity a precondition for enforcement of foreign judgments, 98 and the
Restatement of Conflicts questions whether considerations of reciprocity are
material. 99
3. Public Policy
Foreign-country judgments that violate the public policy of the recogni-
tion forum will not be enforced by a U.S. court. 10 It is generally held that
it is not a violation of a jurisdiction's public policy because the law of the
forum would not have given a cause of action to the plaintiff' 0' or because
its law is different from that of the jurisdiction rendering the judgment.10 2
The cases are not entirely uniform on this point.'0 3 The Uniform Act also
recognizes this defense, without explaining which public policies will
require a court to refuse to enforce a judgment. 1 4
The public policy exception has often been used as a catch-all reason for
denying recognition to a foreign judgment. 0 5 It has been said that the
essence of this defense is that giving conclusive effect to a foreign judgment
would in some way be unfair to one of the parties.' 0 6 One court, however,
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412 (1964). The Court did note:
Furthermore, the question whether a country gives res judicata effect to United States judg-
ments presents a relatively simple inquiry. The precise status of the United States Govern-
ment and its nationals before foreign courts is much more difficult to determine.
Id.
"Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
97See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.98See Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 4 (Grounds for Non-Recognition).
"RESTATEMENT § 98, comment e (1971).
"°See, e.g., Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d 611,
614 (1st Cir. 1977); Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1976);
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Zanzonico v. Neeld, 17 N.J. 400, 1iI A.2d 772 (1955); MacDon-
ald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 71 N.H. 448, 52 A. 982, 987 (1902); RESTATEMENT § 98, comment
g, § 117, comment c (1971).
'
0E.g., Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147-48 (Ist Dep't 1958).
'°
2Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009,
1014-15 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Fronteriza v. Spann, 41 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Tex. 1941), afl'dsub noma. Spann v. Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora
Fronteriza, S.A., 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209
N.E.2d 709, 712-13 (1965), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See also Sangiovanni Her-
nandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d 611, 614-15 (Ist Cir. 1977).
'°
3See, e.g., Ryder v. Ryder, 37 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
'Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b)(3).05
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 20, at 61.
' Id. at 63.
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has said that a foreign judgment must be injurious to public health, public
morals, or public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law
or must undermine the public's sense of security for individual rights before
it will violate the forum's public policy to such an extent that nonrecogni-
tion will be mandated. 0 7
4. Mistake of Law or Fact
The Supreme Court stated in Hilton that an action previously decided by
a foreign court could not be tried afresh in the United States upon the mere
assertion that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact, provided the
judgment met the other requirements of the Court. 0 8 The Court rein-
forced this decision thirty-two years later when it held that a Philippine
court could not refuse to give effect to a Hong Kong judgment on the
ground that the Hong Kong court had made a mistake by not giving effect
within its territory to a sale by the American Alien Property Custodian.' 0 9
The rule that a foreign-nation judgment cannot be attacked because the
rendering Court made a mistake of law or fact still prevails today. " 0
5. Lack of Notice to Defendant
The due process clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that before per-
sonal jurisdiction can be obtained, the defendant must have been served
with process and given reasonable notice of the proceedings."' Several
cases have determined that service of process upon a nonresident defendant
by publication was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction. "1 2 Courts have
even held that personal service was insufficient if it failed to give adequate
notice of the proceedings. 113
'°TSomportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See also Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 322 (Tex.
1979) (the laws of a foreign nation do not violate the public policy of Texas unless they are
"inimical to good morals, natural justice, or the general interests of the citizens of this state").
'Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 203 (1895).
'°Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927).
"'See e.g., Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976); MacDonald v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., 71 N.H. 448, 52 A. 982, 987 (1902); RESTATEMENT § 106 (1971). The rule
differs somewhat in child custody cases, because new facts or circumstances can always be
proved to overturn the judgment. See e.g., Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961);
Willson v. Willson, 55 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951); Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431, 439
(D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
.'Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946); Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D.
Ohio 1951); Compagnie du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163,
165 (D. Me. 1927); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (1915).
"
2See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 21 So.2d 141, 142 (Fla. 1945); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex.
522, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (1915). In Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951), the
court even held that personal service was insufficient when the Canadian statute provided only
for service by publication and gave the court discretion to use other methods of service.
"
3Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (service
by mail was insufficient when suit papers were prepared in German, but defendant did not
read German); Hager v. Hager, 274 N.E.2d 157, 160-161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (personal service
insufficient when complaint only was served without summons showing appearance date).
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Procedures for Enforcing the Foreign
Country Judgment
1. Pleading
Generally, a plaintiff should affirmatively plead each of the substantive
elements necessary for a valid judgment."14 It has been held, however, that
a plaintiff need not allege that the foreign court had jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter and of the parties, that the defendant was given notice of the
pendency of the suit and the time to appear, and that a hearing or trial was
held on the merits, because these facts are indispensible conditions of a due
adjudication by a court." 15 Plaintiffs averment that the foreign court duly
adjudicated the matter implies that the defendant was allowed a full
opportunity for a hearing, and whatever is necessarily implied is sufficiently
pleaded." 16 Another court has concluded that a plaintiff need not plead
that the foreign jurisdiction will reciprocally give conclusive effect to Amer-
ican judgments," 17 because lack of reciprocity is a defensive matter, and it
must be pleaded and proved by the defendant." t8
2. Burden of Proof
The proper placement of the burden of proof on the parties to a foreign-
country judgment is an area that has suffered from a general lack of atten-
tion by the courts. In fact, only a handful of courts have expressly consid-
ered the issue. Every reasonable presumption is normally indulged in favor
of judgments, and this has been held true of judgments from foreign
nations.' 19 Thus, when a properly authenticated judgment that is valid on
its face is presented, courts have generally presumed that the necessary req-
uisites to recognition and enforcement of the judgment are met unless chal-
lenged by the defendant. 120 A few courts, however, when faced with a
judgment that they deemed unfair in some manner, have noted in support
of their decision denying recognition that the plaintiff failed to prove one or
more of Hilton's requirements. ' 2'
One court has held that a Bolivian decree was valid on its face and enti-
tled to a presumption that the tribunal had jurisdiction, that due notice was
given to the defendant, that the proceedings were regular, and that the
order was free from fraud or prejudice.' 22 Apparently without proof, the
court also recognized Bolivia as a sovereign government with a civilized
"See notes 37-50 supra and accompanying text.
"Fisher v. Fielding, 34 A. 714 (Conn. 1895).
11 Id
'Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Colo. 1952).
"'Id See generally In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976).
"'See James v. James, 81 Tex. 373, 16 S.W. 1087, 1088 (1891).
'
20See generally von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 20, at 55-56.
2'Traders' Trust Co. v. Davidson, 178 N.W. 735, 736-37 (Minn. 1920); Hager v. Hager, 274
N.E.2d 157, 160 (I11. Ct. App. 1971).
"'Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
U.S. Practice: Recognition of Foreign Judgments 439
jurisprudence. 123 Other courts have presumed that the foreign court ren-
dering the judgment had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the par-
ties,124 that a foreign judgment was final, 125 that the acts of a foreign court
were rightly and duly performed, 126 and that the rights and liabilities of the
parties were determined according to the law and procedure of the country
where rendered. 127 It has been held to be the burden of the party relying
on a judgment to prove the conclusive effect given it by the rendering juris-
diction,128 but the failure to do so will merely result in the application of
the forum's law. 1
29
The proper burden for a plaintiff can be summarized by saying that he
must produce a properly authenticated judgment that appears on its face to
be valid and final. When these requirements are met, the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie case for recognition of the judgment. The other require-
ments of the plaintiffs case are filled in by presumptions. These presump-
tions are, however, rebuttable. When the plaintiff has presented a prima
facie case, then at least the burden of producing evidence and perhaps the
burden of persuasion will be fixed on the defendant. 130 If the defendant
fails to rebut the presumptions, then no fact issue will be presented and the
presumptions will become conclusive.' 3 '
This system of ordering the parties' cases and allocating the burden of
proof will promote the policy of putting an end to litigation while preserv-
ing the rights of individual litigants. Moreover, it also gives due deference
to the interests of the foreign government, thereby reducing the possibility
of an intrusion into the arena of foreign policy.
Currency Exchange Rates
In Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 132 the Supreme Court,
in an action on a contract, held that the correct exchange rate for a foreign
judgment is the rate prevailing on the date that the suit to recognize the
foreign judgment is filed, rather than the date that the contract is
breached. 133 The Court stated that the date of breach fixes the defendant's
liability in the foreign currency, but that obligation bears the risk of
1231d.
'
24Traders' Trust Co. v. Davidson, 178 N.W. 735, 736 (Minn. 1920).
25164 East Seventy-Second Street Corp. v. Ismay, 151 P.2d 29, 30 (Cal. App. 1944).
2
'Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933 holding approved).
'"Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121, 122
(1926); Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729, 730 (1893); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp
& Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284, 285 (3d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159
N.E. 669 (1927).
"'Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 742-43 (1970).
1"91d. 265 N.E.2d at 742. See generally Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197, 202 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1968, no writ).
'
3
°C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 342 at 803, § 345 at 826-27 (1972 E. Cleary, ed.)
3'd. § 345 at 820.
32272 U.S. 517 (1926).
'"Id. at 519.
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exchange fluctuations. 134 Despite the plain language of Justice Holme's
opinion, subsequent cases have construed Humphrey as holding that the
proper exchange rate for translating foreign-nation judgments into U.S.
dollars is that in existence when the American court renders its judg-
ment.135 Even though there is some authority to the contrary, 136 the judg-
ment-day rule has become the general rule in the United States. 137 This
rule makes sense, because it is less subject to manipulation than the filing-
day rule of Humphrey, and it is more likely to yield the plaintiff the extrin-
sic value of the judgment at the time it is actually collected.
Effect of Foreign Country Judgment
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are based on the
policy of discouraging repetitious litigation and putting an end to it. They
can be distinguished because res judicata is generally applied only when
there is an identity of parties from one litigation to the other, and because
res judicata serves to preclude not only relitigation of issues actually liti-
gated and determined, but also issues that could have been raised. Collat-
eral estoppel can often be applied against a party to the first litigation even
though the party asserting the doctrine was not a party to the prior case.
But it is applied only to issues actually tried and decided in the first case.
1. Res Judicata
Res judicata effect is usually allowed by American courts to foreign-
nation judgments meeting the requirements both of a valid judgment and of




3 Paris v. Central Chiclera, S. de R.L., 193 F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1952); Shaw, Savill,
Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1951); Indian Refining Co. v.
Valvoline Oil Co., 75 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1935); Tillman v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d
1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1931); Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1,
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'
3 Indian Refining Co. v. Valvoline Oil Co., 75 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1935) (approving a
foreign judgment's conversion at exchange rates prevailing at date of trial); Hoppe v. Russo-
Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923). See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY AND THE LAW:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 348 (1950); Becker, The Currency of Judgment, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 157 (1977). Contra Jones, The Spurious Judgment Day Rule for Converting Foreign
Currency into Dollars When Suit Is Brought upon an Obligation Governed by Foreign Law, 3
INT'L LAW. 277 (1969) (advocating conversion as of date suit is filed).
'"Paris v. Central Chiclera, S. de R.L., 193 F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1952); Shaw, Savill,
Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1950); Island Territory of
Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. I, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); RESTATEMENT § 101,
comment g (1971); Scoles & Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation Judg-
ments., California, Oregon and Washington, 57 ORE. L. REV. 377, 392 (1978). But see United
States National Bank v. United States, 23 F.2d 927, 928 (S.D. Tex. 1928) (no further action can
be maintained after French judgment paid in francs).
3
'See, e.g., Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d 611,
615 (1st Cir. 1977); Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La. 726, 189 So. 116, 118 (1939); Cardy v.
Cardy, 23 App. Div. 2d 117, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 944, 960 (lst Dep't 1965).
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judicata effect if they have been accepted or approved by a court. 139 Courts
sometimes refuse to apply the doctrine because of a lack of identity of the
parties, 140 or because of a difference in the causes of action sued upon.' 4'
Generally, American courts will give a foreign judgment the same effect
to which it is entitled in the jurisdiction where rendered. ' 42 By way of limi-
tation, however, most courts have refused to give foreign-country judg-
ments any greater force or effect than that afforded to sister-state
judgments. 143 The Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act provides
that a foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as a sister-state
judgment,'"4 while the Restatement says that a foreign-nation judgment
will be given the same degree of recognition as a sister-state judgment. 145
2. Collateral Estoppel
U.S. courts will normally afford collateral estoppel effect to foreign judg-
ments in the proper circumstances. 46 Courts in this country have this
power even though the jurisdiction rendering the judgment could not give it
collateral estoppel effect. 14 7 One court has suggested caution, however,
when applying collateral estoppel to a civil law judgment. ' 48
Collateral estoppel effect has been allowed to crucial facts necessarily
determined in foreign litigation and dispositive of the U.S. suit.14 9 The
doctrine has been denied application when the foreign suit involved prop-
erty different from that at issue in the United States litigation' 50 or when
the defendant was not a party or a privy to the foreign Suit. 15 1 But one who
had control over, or was the successor in interest to or was in privity with a
'
39Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d 611, 615-16 (Ist
Cir. 1977); Cardy v. Cardy, 23 App. Div. 2d 117, 258 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1st Dep't 1965).
'"In re Zeitz' Estates, 135 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Surrogate's Ct. 1954).
"'Leo Fiest, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623, 623-24 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
W2 Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Schoenbrod v.
Siegler, 20 N.Y.2d 403, 230 N.E.2d 638, 641 (1967); Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195 A.2d 418, 421
(Conn. 1963); Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 504 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961);
Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 147 A. 715, 717 (Md. 1929); Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d
678, 683-85 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
''Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Pope v. Heckscher, 266 N.Y.
114, 194 N.E. 53, 54 (1934); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 P.
542, 557 (1915); Gruvel v. Nassauer, 210 N.Y. 149, 102 N.E. 1113, 1114 (1913).
'"Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 3.
4
'RESTATEMENT § 98, comment f (1971).
" See generally Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 504-511 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964
(1961).
"'Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
'Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 507 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
"'Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd., 470 F. Supp.
610, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Dembar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623, 623-24
(E.D. Pa. 1964); In re Zeitz' Estates, 135 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (Surrogate's Ct. 1954).
0 Flora Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 218 F.
Supp. 938, 942-43 (D. Md. 1963); Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 511 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 964 (1961).
"'Kane v. Central American Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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party to, the foreign suit will be bound by the judgment rendered.' 52 The
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel will not usually prevent the application of
the collateral estoppel rule.'
5 3
Inconsistent Prior Judgments
When two conflicting judgments on the same cause of action exist, the
general rule in the United States is to give effect to the second judgment.154
The rule is based on the theory that the effect of the first judgment has been
determined by the second suit.' 5 5 The rule- is applied to foreign as well as
domestic judgments.' 56 But if the subsequent decision did not rule upon
the effect of the first judgment, then the prior decree may be recognized and
enforced. ' 5
7
The Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act, however, allows a
court to refuse recognition to a foreign-country money judgment if it con-
flicts with another final and conclusive judgment.158 No guidelines are laid
down concerning which of two conflicting judgments are to be recognized,
and a court could refuse to give effect to either.
Conclusion
The bread and butter issue for a trial lawyer is to determine the elements
of his case and the facts upon which he bears the burden of proof. But the
American practice concerning such matters with respect to the recognition
of foreign-nation judgments has been riddled with confusion. It is hoped
that the procedures outlined in this article for ordering the parties' respec-
tive cases and for fixing the burden of proof will clarify and simplify these
matters.
" Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1970).
"'Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd., 470 F. Supp.
610, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 506 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Ambatielos
v. Foundation Co., 202 Misc. 470, 116 NY.S.2d 641, 648 (1952).
"'Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 506 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Ambatielos
v. Foundation Co., 202 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641, 648 (1952); von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 20, at 71.
"'Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 202 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641, 648 (1952).
...Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
"'Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b)(4).
